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Abstract
With the growing popularity of deep-learning
based NLP models, comes a need for inter-
pretable systems. But what is interpretability,
and what constitutes a high-quality interpreta-
tion? In this opinion piece we reflect on the
current state of interpretability evaluation re-
search. We call for more clearly differentiat-
ing between different desired criteria an inter-
pretation should satisfy, and focus on the faith-
fulness criteria. We survey the literature with
respect to faithfulness evaluation, and arrange
the current approaches around three assump-
tions, providing an explicit form to how faith-
fulness is “defined” by the community. We
provide concrete guidelines on how evaluation
of interpretation methods should and should
not be conducted. Finally, we claim that the
current binary definition for faithfulness sets a
potentially unrealistic bar for being considered
faithful. We call for discarding the binary no-
tion of faithfulness in favor of a more graded
one, which we believe will be of greater prac-
tical utility.
1 Introduction
Fueled by recent advances in deep-learning and
language processing, NLP systems are increasingly
being used for prediction and decision-making in
many fields (Vig and Belinkov, 2019), including
sensitive ones such as health, commerce and law
(Fort and Couillault, 2016). Unfortunately, these
highly flexible and highly effective neural models
are also opaque. There is therefore a critical need
for explaining learning-based models’ decisions.
The emerging research topic of interpretability
or explainability1 has grown rapidly in recent years.
Unfortunately, not without growing pains.
1Despite fine-grained distinctions between the terms,
within the scope of this work we use the terms “interpretability”
and “explainability” interchangeably.
One such pain is the challenge of defining—and
evaluating—what constitutes a quality interpreta-
tion. Current approaches define interpretation in a
rather ad-hoc manner, motivated by practical use-
cases and applications. However, this view often
fails to distinguish between distinct aspects of the
interpretation’s quality, such as readability, plausi-
bility and faithfulness (Herman, 2017).2 We argue
(§2, §5) such conflation is harmful, and that faith-
fulness should be defined and evaluated explicitly,
and independently from plausibility.
Our main focus is the evaluation of the faith-
fulness of an explanation. Intuitively, a faithful
interpretation is one that accurately represents the
reasoning process behind the model’s prediction.
We find this to be a pressing issue in explainabil-
ity: in cases where an explanation is required to
be faithful, imperfect or misleading evaluation can
have disastrous effects.
While literature in this area may implicitly or
explicitly evaluate faithfulness for specific expla-
nation techniques, there is no consistent and for-
mal definition of faithfulness. We uncover three
assumptions that underlie all these attempts. By
making the assumptions explicit and organizing the
literature around them, we “connect the dots” be-
2Unfortunately, the terms in the literature are not yet stan-
dardized, and vary widely. “Readability” and “plausibility” are
also referred to as “human-interpretability” and “persuasive-
ness”, respectively (e.g., Lage et al. (2019); Herman (2017)).
To our knowledge, the term “faithful interpretability” was
coined in Harrington et al. (1985), reinforced by Ribeiro et al.
(2016), and is, we believe, most commonly used (e.g., Gilpin
et al. (2018); Wu and Mooney (2018); Lakkaraju et al. (2019)).
Chakraborty et al. (2017) refers to this issue (more or less) as
“accountability”. Sometimes referred to as how “trustworthy”
(Camburu et al., 2019) or “descriptive” (Carmona et al., 2015;
Biecek, 2018) the interpretation is, or as “descriptive accuracy”
(Murdoch et al., 2019). Also related to the “transparency”
(Baan et al., 2019), the “fidelity” (Guidotti et al., 2018) or
the “robustness” (Alvarez-Melis and Jaakkola, 2018) of the
interpretation method. And frequently, simply “explainability”
is inferred to require faithfulness by default.
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tween seemingly distinct evaluation methods, and
also provide a basis for discussion regarding the
desirable properties of faithfulness (§6).
Finally, we observe a trend by which faithfulness
is treated as a binary property, followed by showing
that an interpretation method is not faithful. We
claim that this is unproductive (§7), as the assump-
tions are nearly impossible to satisfy fully, and it
is all too easy to disprove the faithfulness of an
interpretation method via a counter-example. What
can be done? We argue for a more practical view of
faithfulness, calling for a graded criteria that mea-
sures the extent and likelihood of an interpretation
to be faithful, in practice (§8). While we started to
work in this area, we pose the exact formalization
of these criteria, and concrete evaluations methods
for them, as a central challenge to the community
for the coming future.
2 Faithfulness vs. Plausibility
There is considerable research effort in attempting
to define and categorize the desiderata of a learned
system’s interpretation, most of which revolves
around specific use-cases (Lipton, 2018; Guidotti
et al., 2018, inter alia).
Two particularly notable criteria, each useful for
a different purposes, are plausibility and faithful-
ness. “Plausibility” refers to how convincing the
interpretation is to humans, while “faithfulness”
refers to how accurately it reflects the true reason-
ing process of the model (Herman, 2017; Wiegreffe
and Pinter, 2019).
Naturally, it is possible to satisfy one of these
properties without the other. For example, con-
sider the case of interpretation via post-hoc text
generation—where an additional “generator” com-
ponent outputs a textual explanation of the model’s
decision, and the generator is learned with super-
vision of textual explanations (Zaidan and Eisner,
2008; Rajani et al., 2019; Strout et al., 2019). In
this case, plausibility is the dominating property,
while there is no faithfulness guarantee.
Despite the difference between the two criteria,
many authors do not clearly make the distinction,
and sometimes conflate the two.3 Moreoever, the
majority of works do not explicitly name the cri-
teria under consideration, even when they clearly
belong to one camp or the other.4
3E.g., Lundberg and Lee (2017); Po¨rner et al. (2018); Wu
and Mooney (2018).
4 E.g., Mohseni and Ragan (2018); Arras et al. (2016);
We argue that this conflation is dangerous. For
example, consider the case of recidivism prediction,
where a judge is exposed to a model’s prediction
and its interpretation, and the judge believes the
interpretation to reflect the model’s reasoning pro-
cess. Since the interpretation’s faithfulness carries
legal consequences, a plausible but unfaithful inter-
pretation may be the worst-case scenario. The lack
of explicit claims by research may cause misinfor-
mation to potential users of the technology, who
are not versed in its inner workings.5 Therefore,
clear distinction between these terms is critical.
3 Inherently Interpretable?
A distinction is often made between two methods of
achieving interpretability: (1) interpreting existing
models via post-hoc techniques; and (2) designing
inherently interpretable models. Rudin (2018) ar-
gues in favor of inherently interpretable models,
which by design claim to provide more faithful in-
terpretations than post-hoc interpretation of black-
box models.
We warn against taking this argumentation at
face-value: a method being “inherently inter-
pretable” is merely a claim that needs to be verified
before it can be trusted. Indeed, while attention
mechanisms have been considered as “inherently in-
terpretable” (Ghaeini et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2017),
recent work cast doubt regarding their faithfulness
(Serrano and Smith, 2019; Jain and Wallace, 2019;
Wiegreffe and Pinter, 2019).
4 Evaluation via Utility
While explanations have many different use-cases,
such as model debugging, lawful guarantees or
health-critical guarantees, one other possible use-
case with particularly prominent evaluation litera-
ture is Intelligent User Interfaces (IUI), via Human-
Computer Interaction (HCI), of automatic models
assisting human decision-makers. In this case, the
goal of the explanation is to increase the degree
of trust between the user and the system, giving
the user more nuance towards whether the system’s
decision is likely correct, or not. In the general
case, the final evaluation metric is the performance
of the user at their task (Abdul et al., 2018). For
example, Feng and Boyd-Graber (2019) evaluate
Xiong et al. (2018); Weerts et al. (2019).
5As Kaur et al. (2019) concretely show, even experts are
prone to overly trust the faithfulness of explanations, despite
no guarantee.
various explanations of a model in a setting of trivia
question answering.
However, in the context of faithfulness, we must
warn against HCI-inspired evaluation, as well: in-
creased performance in this setting is not in-
dicative of faithfulness; rather, it is indicative
of correlation between the plausibility of the ex-
planations and the model’s performance.
To illustrate, consider the following fictional
case of a non-faithful explanation system, in an
HCI evaluation setting: the explanation given is a
heat-map of the textual input, attributing scores to
various tokens. Assume the system explanations
behave in the following way: when the output is
correct, the explanation consists of random content
words; and when the output is incorrect, it consists
of random punctuation marks. In other words, the
explanation is more likely to appear plausible when
the model is correct, while at the same time not re-
flecting the true decision process of the model. The
user, convinced by the nicer-looking explanations,
performs better using this system. However, the
explanation consistently claimed random tokens to
be highly relevant to the model’s reasoning process.
While the system is concretely useful, the claims
given by the explanation do not reflect the model’s
decisions whatsoever (by design).
While the above scenario is extreme, this misun-
derstanding is not entirely unlikely, since any de-
gree of correlation between plausibility and model
performance will result in increased user perfor-
mance, regardless of any notion of faithfulness.
5 Guidelines for Evaluating Faithfulness
We propose the following guidelines for evaluating
the faithfulness of explanations. These guidelines
address common pitfalls and sub-optimal practices
we observed in the literature.
Be explicit in what you evaluate. Conflating
plausability and faithfulness is harmful. You should
be explicit on which one of them you evaluate,
and use suitable methodologies for each one. Of
course, the same applies when designing interpre-
tation techniques—be clear about which properties
are being prioritized.
Faithfulness evaluation should not involve
human-judgement on the quality of interpreta-
tion. We note that: (1) humans cannot judge if an
interpretation is faithful or not: if they understood
the model, interpretation would be unnecessary;
(2) for similar reasons, we cannot obtain supervi-
sion for this problem, either. Therefore, human
judgement should not be involved in evaluation for
faithfulness, as human judgement measures plaus-
ability.
Faithfulness evaluation should not involve
human-provided gold labels. We should be
able to interpret incorrect model predictions, just
the same as correct ones. Evaluation methods that
rely on gold labels are influenced by human priors
on what should the model do, and again push the
evaluation in the direction of plausability.
Do not trust “inherent interpretability” claims.
Inherent interpretability is a claim until proven oth-
erwise. Explanations provided by “inherently in-
terpretable” models must be held to the same stan-
dards as post-hoc interpretation methods, and be
evaluated for faithfulness using the same set of
evaluation techniques.
Faithfulness evaluation of IUI systems should
not rely on user performance. End-task user
performance in HCI settings is merely indicative of
correlation between plausibility and model perfor-
mance, however small this correlation is. While im-
portant to evaluate the utility of the interpretations
for some use-cases, it is unrelated to faithfulness.
6 Defining Faithfulness
What does it mean for an interpretation method to
be faithful? Intuitively, we would like the provided
interpretation to reflect the true reasoning process
of the model when making a decision. But what
is a reasoning process of a model, and how can
reasoning processes be compared to each other?
Lacking a standard definition, different works
evaluate their methods by introducing tests to mea-
sure properties that they believe good interpreta-
tions should satisfy. Some of these tests measure
aspects of faithfulness. These ad-hoc definitions
are often unique to each paper and inconsistent with
each other, making it hard to find commonalities.
We uncover three assumptions that underlie all
these methods, enabling us to organize the litera-
ture along standardized axes, and relate seemingly
distinct lines of work. Moreover, exposing the
underlying assumptions enables an informed dis-
cussion regarding their validity and merit (we leave
such a discussion for future work, by us or others).
These assumptions, to our knowledge, encapsu-
late the current working definitions of faithfulness
used by the research community.
Assumption 1 (The Model Assumption). Two
models will make the same predictions if and only
if they use the same reasoning process.
Corollary 1.1. An interpretation system is un-
faithful if it results in different interpretations of
models that make the same decisions.
As demonstrated by a recent example concerning
NLP models, it can be used for proof by counter-
example. Theoretically, if all possible models
which can perfectly mimic the model’s decisions
also provide the same interpretations, then they
could be deemed faithful. Conversely, showing
that two models provide the same results but dif-
ferent interpretations, disprove the faithfulness of
the method. Wiegreffe and Pinter (2019) show
how these counter-examples can be derived with
adversarial training of models which can mimic the
original model, yet provide different explanations.6
Corollary 1.2. An interpretation is unfaithful if
it results in different decisions than the model it
interprets.
A more direct application of the Model Assump-
tion is via the notion of fidelity (Guidotti et al.,
2018; Lakkaraju et al., 2019). For cases in which
the explanation is itself a model capable of making
decisions (e.g., decision trees or rule lists (Sushil
et al., 2018)), fidelity is defined as the degree to
which the explanation model can mimic the original
model’s decisions (as an accuracy score). For cases
where the explanation is not a computable model,
Doshi-Velez and Kim (2017) propose a simple way
of mapping explanations to decisions via crowd-
sourcing, by asking humans to simulate the model’s
decision without any access to the model, and only
access to the input and explanation (termed for-
ward simulation). This idea is further explored and
used in practice by Nguyen (2018).
Assumption 2 (The Prediction Assumption).
On similar inputs, the model makes similar deci-
sions if and only if its reasoning is similar.
Corollary 2. An interpretation system is unfaith-
ful if it provides different interpretations for similar
inputs and outputs.
Since the interpretation serves as a proxy for the
model’s “reasoning”, it should satisfy the same con-
straints. In other words, interpretations of similar
6We note that in context, Wiegreffe and Pinter also utilize
the model assumption to show that some explanations do carry
useful information on the model’s behavior.
decisions should be similar, and interpretations of
dissimilar decisions should be dissimilar.
This assumption is more useful to disprove the
faithfulness of an interpretation rather than prove it,
since a disproof requires finding appropriate cases
where the assumption doesn’t hold, where a proof
would require checking a (very large) satisfactory
quantity of examples, or even the entire input space.
One recent discussion in the NLP community
(Jain and Wallace, 2019; Wiegreffe and Pinter,
2019) concerns the use of this underlying assump-
tion for evaluating attention heat-maps as expla-
nations. The former attempts to provide different
explanations of similar decisions per instance. The
latter critiques the former and is based more heavily
on the model assumption, described above.
Additionally, Kindermans et al. (2019) propose
to introduce a constant shift to the input space, and
evaluate whether the explanation changes signifi-
cantly as the final decision stays the same. Alvarez-
Melis and Jaakkola (2018) formalize a generaliza-
tion of this technique under the term interpretabil-
ity robustness: interpretations should be invariant
to small perturbations in the input (a direct conse-
quence of the prediction assumption). Wolf et al.
(2019) further expand on this notion as “consis-
tency of the explanation with respect to the model”.
Unfortunately, robustness measures are difficult to
apply in NLP settings due to the discrete input.
Assumption 3 (The Linearity Assumption).7
Certain parts of the input are more important to
the model reasoning than others. Moreover, the
contributions of different parts of the input are in-
dependent from each other.
Corollary 3. Under certain circumstances, heat-
map interpretations can be faithful.
This assumption is employed by methods that
consider heat-maps8 (e.g., attention maps) over the
input as explanations, particularly popular in NLP.
Heat-maps are claims about which parts of the in-
put are more relevant than others to the model’s
decision. As such, we can design “stress tests” to
verify whether they uphold their claims.
One method proposed to do so is erasure, where
the “most relevant” parts of the input—according
to the explanation—are erased from the input, in
7This assumption has gone through justified scrutiny in
recent work. As mentioned previously, we do not necessarily
endorse it. Nevertheless, it is used in parts of the literature.
8Also referred to as feature-attribution explanations (Kim
et al., 2017).
expectation that the model’s decision will change
(Arras et al., 2016; Feng et al., 2018; Serrano and
Smith, 2019). Otherwise, the “least relevant” parts
of the input may be erased, in expectation that
the model’s decision will not change (Jacovi et al.,
2018). Yu et al. (2019); DeYoung et al. (2019)
propose two measures of comprehensiveness and
sufficiency as a formal generalization of erasure:
as the degree by which the model is influenced
by the removal of the high-ranking features, or by
inclusion of solely the high-ranking features.
7 Is Faithful Interpretation Impossible?
The aforementioned assumptions are currently uti-
lized to evaluate faithfulness in a binary manner,
whether an interpretation is strictly faithful or not.
Specifically, they are most often used to show that
a method is not faithful, by constructing cases in
which the assumptions do not hold for the sug-
gested method.9 In other words, there is a clear
trend of proof via counter-example, for various
interpretation methods, that they are not glob-
ally faithful.
We claim that this is unproductive, as we ex-
pect these various methods to consistently result in
negative (not faithful) results, continuing the cur-
rent trend. This follows because an interpretation
functions as an approximation of the model or de-
cision’s true reasoning process, so it by definition
loses information. By the pigeonhole principle,
there will be inputs with deviation between inter-
pretation and reasoning.
This is observed in practice, in numerous work
that show adversarial behavior, or pathological be-
haviours, that arise from the deeply non-linear and
high-dimensional decision boundaries of current
models.10 Furthermore, because we lack super-
vision regarding which models or decisions are
indeed mappable to human-readable concepts, we
cannot ignore the approximation errors.
This poses a high bar for explanation methods
to fulfill, a bar which we estimate will not be over-
come soon, if at all. What should we do, then, if we
desire a system that provides faithful explanations?
9Whether for attention (Baan et al., 2019; Pruthi et al.,
2019; Jain and Wallace, 2019; Serrano and Smith, 2019;
Wiegreffe and Pinter, 2019), saliency methods (Alvarez-Melis
and Jaakkola, 2018; Kindermans et al., 2019), or others (Ghor-
bani et al., 2019; Feng et al., 2018).
10Kim et al. (2017); Feng et al. (2018, §6) discuss this point
in the context of heat-map explanations.
8 Towards Better Faithfulness Criteria
We argue that a way out of this standstill is in a
more practical and nuanced methodology for defin-
ing and evaluating faithfulness. We propose the fol-
lowing challenge to the community: We must de-
velop formal definition and evaluation for faith-
fulness that allows us the freedom to say when
a method is sufficiently faithful to be useful in
practice.
We note two possible approaches to this end:
1. Across models and tasks: The degree (as
grayscale) of faithfulness at the level of spe-
cific models and tasks. Perhaps some models
or tasks allow sufficiently faithful interpreta-
tion, even if the same is not true for others.11
For example, the method may not be faithful
for some question-answering task, but faithful
for movie review sentiment, perhaps based on
various syntactic and semantic attributes of
those tasks.
2. Across input space: The degree of faithful-
ness at the level of subspaces of the input
space, such as neighborhoods of similar in-
puts, or singular inputs themselves. If we are
able to say with some degree of confidence
whether a specific decision’s explanation is
faithful to the model, even if the interpretation
method is not considered universally faithful,
it can be used with respect to those specific
areas or instances only.
9 Conclusion
The opinion proposed in this paper is two-fold:
First, interpretability evaluation often conflates
evaluating faithfulness and plausibility together.
We should tease apart the two definitions and focus
solely on evaluating faithfulness without any super-
vision or influence of the convincing power of the
interpretation.
Second, faithfulness is often evaluated in a bi-
nary “faithful or not faithful” manner, and we be-
lieve strictly faithful interpretation is a “unicorn”
which will likely never be found. We should instead
evaluate faithfulness on a more nuanced “grayscale”
that allows interpretations to be useful even if they
are not globally and definitively faithful.
11As noted by Wiegreffe and Pinter (2019); Vashishth et al.
(2019), although in the context of attention solely.
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